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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THERMOID WESTERN CO., NORMAN 
THOMPSON LUMBER & HARD-
WARE CO., INC., UTAH POULTRY 
& FARMERS COOPERATIVE, UTAH 
LUMBER CO., and STOKERMATIC 
CO., on their own behalf and on behalf 
of other persons, corporations, and asso-
ciations similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-
PANY, THE DENVER AND RIO 
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD 
COMPANY, THE WESTERN PA-
CIFIC COMPANY and BAMBERGER 
RAILROAD COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9254 
Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants 
INTRODUCTION 
The plaintiffs and appellants are firms and associations 
doing business within the state of Utah and which ship freight 
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intrastate by railroad within the state of Utah. The defendants 
are railroads operating through and within the state of Utah. 
This is an action to recover the difference between the 
freight rates charged by the defendant railroads to the plain-
tiffs and proper and valid charges as established by the tariffs 
on file with and approved by the Public Service Commission 
of Utah. The period of time covered by this action is from 
June 22, 1956 to August 28, 1958. 
This action concerns only the liability of the defendants 
for the overcharges. The parties have stipulated that the 
amount of the overcharges shall be determined in a subsequent 
accounting if the issue of liability is found against the de-
fendants. 
The action was filed in the Third Judicial District Court 
in Salt Lake County. The defendants filed notice of removal 
to the federal court on the alleged grounds that the plaintiffs' 
recovery depended upon an interpretation of a federal law. 
Judge Willis W. Ritter denied the motion of the plaintiffs 
to remand and restrained counsel for the plaintiffs from bring-
ing any like actions for other clients in the state courts. On 
appeal, the United States Circuit Court, Tenth Circuit, decided 
that there was no federal question involved, ordered the injunc-
tion dissolved and ordered the case remanded to the state 
court.* 
*This decision is reported at 269 Fed. 2nd 714. The case is entitled 
Structural Steel & Forge Co. et al v. Union Pacific RR, et al, because 
the appeal was actually taken by Structural Steel and Forge Co., which, 
although . not a party to the action, was restrained by the federal 
district court from bringing an action of its own in the state courts 
allegedly because the court had to do that to protect its jurisdiction 
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Upon trial of the issues affecting liability in the state court, 
the Hon. Ray VanCott held in favor of the defendants and 
against the plaintiffs on the question of liability. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the year 1951 the major railroads operating tn the 
United States made application to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission for an increase of 15% in interstate freight rates 
and charges. This permission was granted by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission in a proceeding known as Ex Parte 175. 
At the same time the rna jor railroads operating in and 
through Utah made application to the Public Service Com-
mission of Utah for an increase of 15% in Utah intrastate 
freight rates and charges. After a hearing before the Public 
Service Commission of Utah on this application, the appli-
cation was denied for lack of sufficient evidence without 
prejudice to the rights of the railroads to reopen and introduce 
additional evidence. 
The railroads took no further proceedings before the 
Public Service Commission of Utah, but made application 
to the Interstate Commerce Commission to increase the Utah 
intrastate rates under the provisions of 49 U.S.C. 13 (3) ( 4) 
on the alleged ground that the Utah rates were so low as to 
cast a burden on interstate commerce. After hearing, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission issued its order taking juris-
diction of the Utah intrastate rates and granting the increase 
of this case-the Thermoid case. However, the issues involved in the 
Structural Steel & Forge case in the lOth Circuit are the issues of this 
case now being tried by this court. 
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of 15% sought. In this Order the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission ordered the 15% increase and informed the Public 
Service Commission of Utah that it would have 30 days within 
which to make the rates effective, otherwise the Interstate 
Commerce Commission would, on its own order, place said 
increased rates into effect. 
The Public Service Commission declined to make the rates 
effective on its order, and a final order was issued by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission making the 15% increase 
effective as to Utah intrastate traffic. 
Thereafter the Public Service Commission and the Utah 
Citizens Rate Association, of which organization some of the 
plaintiffs herein are members, instituted an action in the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah to set aside the 
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission above referred 
to. The case was heard by a Three-Judge court which granted 
a tern porary restraining order pending a final decision of the 
case. The Three-Judge court decided in a two to one decision 
that the action of the Interstate Commerce Commission was 
valid and legal and lifted the temporary restraining order 
allowing the 15% increase to become applicable to Utah intra-
state rates effective as of the 22nd day of June, 1956. The 
Public Service Commission and the Utah Citizens Rate Asso-
ciation then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United 
States frotn the order of the Three-Judge federal district court. 
The United States Supreme Court, after hearing, reversed the 
Three-Judge court with instructions to set aside the order of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission and to remand the matter 
to the Interstate Commerce Commission for further proceed-
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ings in conformity with the Supreme Court decision.* The 
mandate of the Supreme Court was filed in the United States 
District Court on August 27, 1958, on which date the Utah 
intrastate rates reverted to their former level. 
This action is to recover the additional 15% charged 
by the railroads during the time the higher rates were in effect 
between the date of the removal of the injunction by the United 
States District Court and the filing of the mandate from the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
Judge Van Cott held that the plaintiffs were not entitled 
to recover. In seeking a reversal of this decision the plaintiffs 
rely upon the following points: 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION HAD 
JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE ORDER INCREASING 
UTAH INTRASTATE RATES. 
POINT 'fWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE ORDER OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COM-
MISSION RAISING UTAH INTRASTATE RATES WAS 
NOT VOID BUT ONLY VOIDABLE. 
*Public Service Commission of Utah et al v. United States of America 
et al, 356 U. S. 421, 2 L.ed. (2nd) 886. 
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POINT THREE 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFFS MUST SHOW A BASIS FOR RECOVERY 
UPON EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES BEFORE JUDGMENT 
COULD BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS. 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE ACT OF THE RAILROADS IN MAILING THE 
TARIFFS EFFECTUATING THE INCREASE TO THE 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AS AUTHORIZED BY 
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, BUT AS 
DENIED BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH WAS AN EFFECTIVE FILING UNDER THE LAWS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE SUBSEQUENT ORDER OF THE INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE COMMISSION ISSUED IN DECEMBER, 1959, 
REP AIRED THE DEFECTS FOUND BY THE SUPREME 
COURT IN THE EARLIER ORDER. 
POINT SIX 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
AN APPLICATION TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH FOR REPARATIONS IS A PREREQUI-
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SITE TO THE BRINGING OF AN ACTION IN THE 
COURTS TO RECOVER AN OVERCHARGE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION HAD 
JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE ORDER INCREASING 
UTAH INTRASTATE RATES. 
POINT TWO 
Tl-IE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE ORDER OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COM-
MISSION RAISING UTAH INTRASTATE RATES WAS 
NOT VOID BUT ONLY VOIDABLE. 
As these two points are closely related, we will consider 
them together for purposes of argument. It follows as a matter 
of course that if the Interstate Commerce Commission was 
without jurisdiction to enter the contested order, such order 
was void from its inception. 
The cases establishing the above principle are numerous. 
Most of them are collected in the annotations contained in 
An1erican Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum. Without 
citing the cases, the following statements are the summary 
drawn from these numerous cases by the authors of these two 
works: 
ccThe rendttion of a judgment without jurisdiction 
is a usurpation of power and makes the judgment 
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itself coram non judice and ipso facto void." (31 
Am. Jur. 68). 
((A judgment which is void, as distinguished from 
one which is merely voidable, or liable to be vacated 
or set aside for irregularity or other cause, or reversed 
for error, is a mere nullity and has no force or effect. 
It is not binding on anyone; it raises no lien or estop-
pel; and it does not impair or affect the rights of any-
one. It confers no rights on the party in whose favor 
it is given and affords no protection to persons acting 
d 
. * * * * " (4 c J s ) un er 1t . 9 . . . 878 . 
The jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
in this case depends upon the fundamental division of gov-
ernmental powers between the state and the federal govern-
ment. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United 
States gives to Congress the right to regulate interstate and 
foreign commerce. The lOth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States reserves to the states or the people all 
powers not expressly granted to the federal government. Prior 
to the year 1919 the uniform holding of the courts was to 
the effect that the agencies of the federal government had 
no power to regulate or control intrastate rates, the rationale 
of the decision being that such powers were powers reserved 
to the states by the federal constitution. 
In 1919 the landmark case of Houston E & W T RR Co. 
v. U. S., 234 U.S. 242, 58 L.ed. 1541, made a significant change 
in the case law in this regard. This case held that under 
certain circumstances an agency of the federal government 
could take jurisdiction of intrastate freight rates. The rationale 
of this case is to the effect that because the railroads which 
handle both intrastate and interstate shipments are a single 
10 
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economic unit, the federal government has the power to make 
certain that the intrastate rates are not so low that they cast 
a burden on interstate commerce. If they are so low that they 
cast a burden on interstate commerce, then the federal gov-
ernment has jurisdiction, incident to its power to protect inter-
state commerce, to step in and remove this burden. However, 
unless and until the burden is made to appear, there is no 
jurisdiction in the federal agencies to touch the intrastate rates. 
On February 28, 1920, Section 13 of the Interstate Com-
merce Act was passed. ( 49 U.S.C. 13 (3) ( 4)). This act 
merely codifies the holding in the Houston case. 
In every Section 13 case, therefore, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission must determine two distinct questions: 
1. The Jurisdictional Question. 
Are the intrastate rates so low that they do cast a 
burden on interstate commerce; and 
2. The Discretional Question. 
How high must these intrastate rates be raised to 
remove the discrimination. 
If the first question, the jurisdictional question, is answered 
in the negative, the Interstate Commerce Commission has no 
power to proceed further. 
Subsequent cases from the United States Supreme Court 
make abundantly clear the fact that before a federal regulatory 
agency rna y step in and issue any order touching a matter 
ordinarily within the scope of state jurisdiction, the relationship 
to the federal jurisdiction must clearly appear. 
In the case of Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 
11 
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144; 99 L.ed. 35, the Supreme Court in considering a matter 
where an attempt was being made to extend a federal regula-
tion to certain matters in contravention of a state statute, 
stated: 
!'It also is contended that an interpretation must 
prevail as a matter of principle which will give the 
exemption a general and uniform operation in all states 
irrespective of local law. It is, of course, true that uni-
form operation of a federal law is a desirable end and, 
other things being equal, we often have interpreted 
statutes to achieve it. But in no case relied upon did we 
achieve uniformity at the cost of establishing over-
lapping authority over the same subject matter in the 
state and in the federal government." 
In interpreting the power of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission to interfere in intrastate matters, the Supreme 
Court time and again has reiterated the principle that this 
power should be exercised with extreme caution and should be 
exercised only where every element of federal jurisdiction 
appears clearly of record. In the case of Palmer v. Massachu-
setts, 308 U.S. 78, 84 L.ed 93, the Court stated: 
nTo be sure, in recent years Congress has from time 
to time exercised authority over purely intrastate activi-
ties of an interstate carrier when, in the judgment of 
Congres, an interstate carrier constituted, as a matter 
of economic fact, a single organism and could not effec-
tively be regulated as to some of its interstate phases 
without drawing local business within the regulated 
sphere. But such absorption of state authority is a 
delicate exercise of legislative policy in achieving a 
wise accommodation between the needs of central con-
trol and the lively maintenance of local institutions. 
Therefore, in construing legislation this court has dis-
favored inroads by implication on state authority and 
12 
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resolutely confined restnctlons upon the traditional 
po\ver of states to regulate their local transportation 
to the plain mandate of Congress. Minnesota Rate 
Cases (Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U.S. 352, 57 L.ed., 
1511, 33 S. Ct. 729, 48 LRA (NS) 1151, Ann. Cas. 
1916A, 18; cf. Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 82 
L.ed. 3, 58 S. Ct. 87." 
This principle has been reiterated in other cases. See 
Yonkers v. United StateJ, 320 U.S. 685; 88 L.ed 400; Alabama 
Public Service Commission v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341; 95 
L.ed 1022, and Arkansas R.R. Commission v. Chicago, Rock 
Island and Pac. R.R. Co., 274 U.S. 597, 71 L.ed 1224. 
A landmark case in this field is the case of North Carolina 
v. United States, 325 U.S. 507, 89 L.ed 1760, wherein the 
Supreme Court makes it very clear that before the Interstate 
Commerce Commission may issue an order raising intrastate 
rates, its jurisdiction must clearly appear. The language of that 
case is as follows: 
~ c Intrastate transportation is primarily the concern 
of the states. The power of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission with reference to such intrastate rates is 
dominant only so far as necessary to alter rates which 
injuriously affect interstate transportation. American 
Express Company v. South Dakota, 244 U.S. 617, L.ed. 
1352. A scrupulous regard for maintaining the power 
of the state in this field has caused this court to require 
that the Interstate Commerce Commission's orders 
giving precedence to Federal rates must meet ca high 
standard of certainty.' Illinois Central Railroad v. State 
Public Utilities Commission, 245 U.S. 493, 62 L.ed. 
425. Before the Commission can nulify a state rate, 
justification for the r exercise of Federal power must 
clearly appeal.' Florida v. U.S. 282 U.S. 194, 75 L.ed. 
291." (Emphasis added). 
13 
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When the railroads, therefore, allege that the Interstate 
Commerce Commission has blanket jurisdiction to investigate 
and raise intrastate rates and that any order made after the 
investigation begins may be attacked only on the basis of an 
abuse of discretion, they are ignoring these well-established 
rules. The evidence must first establish the jurisdiction and 
then if that is established, the evidence must establish the 
amount of the rate raise justified. However, if the evidence does 
not establish the jurisdiction, the Commission may not proceed 
further, and any attempt to do so is a nullity. 
In th case of Public Service Com1nission of Utah et al v. 
United States of America, et al, 356 U.S. 421, 2 L.ed (2d) 
886, the Sup~e~e Court held that the evidence was not sufficient 
to show that Utah intrastate rates were so low as to cast a 
burden on interstate commerce. Therefore, the power of the 
federal government under the Commerce Clause, as inter-
preted by North Carolina v. United States, supra, did not arise 
and the power to regulate intrastate rates still lay exclusively 
with the state of Utah under the provisions of the lOth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States. Any attempt 
of the federal government to exercise a jurisdiction which it 
did not have under the Constitution and which the Congress 
had not attempted to confer on it under the Interstate Com-
merce Act, was a nullity and void. 
Section 54-3-7, Utah Code Annotated 195 3, provides 1n 
part as follows: 
nExcept as in this chapter otherwise provided, no 
public utility shall charge, demand, collect or receive 
a greater or less or different compensation for any 
product or commodity furnished or to be furnished 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
or for any services rendered or to be rendered than the 
rates, tolls, rentals and charges applicable to such 
products or commodity or services as specified in its 
schedules on file and in effect at the time * * * . " 
It is conceded by all in this case that the rates charged 
were in excess of the tariffs on file with the Public Service 
Commission, which had been approved and authorized by that 
commission. It is conceded that the Public Service Commission 
did not at any time authorize the filing and making effective 
of the schedules effectuating the increase. In fact, the Public 
Service Commission express! y refused to authorize such increase 
at the time application was made to the Public Service Com-
mission by the railroads (Exhibit 2, Page 43) and at the time 
the Interstate Commerce Commission issued its ultimatum to 
the Utah Commission (Exhibit 10) . Therefore, if the increased 
rates are to have any validity at all, they must depend upon 
the Interstate Commerce Commission order. 
Although the ultimate issue was different when this case 
was before the United States Circuit Court of Appeals on 
the motion to remand, many of the subsidiary issues were 
related. In that case (Structural Steel and Forge Company, 
et al. v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, et al., 269 Fed. 2d 
714) the Circuit Court states: 
<(Stripped of its irrelevancies, the removed claim 
is that defendant railroads exacted a rate for intra-
state shipments in excess of those established and on 
file with the competent state regulatory body, and the 
prayer is for restitution of the same. In substance, it is 
the same as the Structural Steel claim in the state court. 
Surely both complaints state a claim on which relief 
can be granted under the laws of the State of Utah, 
15 
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i.e., the right not to be required to pay a higher rate on 
intrastate shipments than that prescribed by applicable 
state law, rule or regulation. The reference then to 
the void or vacated order of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission as a basis for the charges, was not an 
essential ingredient of the claim for restitution. * * * ." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In asserting that they were protected by the void Interstate 
Commerce Commission order prior to the time that it was set 
aside, the railroads rely heavily upon the case of Atlantic 
Coast Line Railroad Company v. Florida, 79 L. ed 1451, 295 
U.S. 301. The Atlantic Coast Line case has certain superficial 
points of similarity with this case, but it is basically entirely 
different. In both cases the Interstate Commerce Commission 
took jurisdiction of intrastate rates and authorized an increase. 
In both cases the order was later set aside. In both cases the 
plaintiffs were seeking to recover the higher rate collected 
between the date of the Interstate Commerce Commission order 
and the date it was set aside. These are the points of similarity 
between the two cases. The points of difference, however, 
completely distinguish these two cases. As was pointed out 
by the Circuit Court of Appeals in Structural Steel and Forge 
Company v. Union Pacific Railroad Company (supra): 
nJurisdiction wise, our case is wholly unlike Atlantic 
Coast Line v. Florida (supra) and United States v. 
Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, where restitution was sought 
in a federal court with conceded jurisdiction to review 
the administrative rate-making process." 
In the Atlantic Coast Line case the Interstate Commerce 
Commission order was set aside because of a defect in the 
findings of the Interstate Comn1erce Commission. The court 
16 
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held that the specific findings as to the evidence were not 
sufficient to sustain the general findings. There was no holding 
of any lack of evidence to give rise to the federal jurisdiction. 
In the case now before this court, the Supreme Court in 
Public Service Commission of Utah v. United States, supra, 
found the evidence insufficient to sustain the federal Juns-
diction. The language of the court is as follows: 
nin the face of this proof, the evidence as to the 
general similarity of conditions falls short of the high 
standard of certainty required." 
This difference is illustrated in the Atlantic Coast Line 
case by the definite holding of the court to the effect that the 
order was not void but voidable. This is in contrast to the case 
of North Carolina v. United States above cited, in which case 
as here, the court found that the evidence was not sufficient 
to give rise to the jurisdiction of the federal body. 
The principal distinction between this case and the 
Atlantic Coast Line case, however, is the basis on which the 
recovery was sought and the method by which it was sought. 
Ifere we have come into the state court and are seeking recovery 
on the grounds that the rates charged were in excess of those 
permitted by a state statute. In the Atlantic Coast Line case 
no such procedure was followed. There no state statute was 
involved. In that case the plaintiffs made application to the 
federal court on a supplemental motion in the very action 
in which they had the Interstate Commerce Commission order 
set aside. Their theory of recovery was that the federal district 
court should have set aside the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission order when application was made to it. If it had set 
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the order aside at that time the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission order would never have gone into effect. Having 
failed to do this, the plaintiffs alleged, the federal court had 
an equitable obligation to make the petitioners whole. The 
Supreme Court held that there was no such equitable obligation 
on a district court. Furthermore, the court held that as the 
plaintiffs were proceeding in equity, the basic consideration 
would be whether or not the rates which were actually charged 
were unreasonably high, not whether they were in excess of 
the schedules filed. In other words they held that the issue 
was not whether the rates were ((illegal," but whether they 
were ((unlawful." The distinction between these two terms 
as it applies to freight rate matters will be discussed in the 
next succeeding section. 
The Supreme Court further held in the Atlantic Coast 
Line case that as the Interstate Commerce Commission had 
had a further hearing and had found that during all of the 
period in question the railroads were actually in need of the 
higher rates to have adequate compensation, the equitable basi~ 
for recovery could not stand. The language of the court is a~ 
follows: 
t tIn the absence of such a showing, the carrier doe! 
not offend against equity or conscience in standing or 
its position and keping what it got." 
In the case now before this court, as we previously pointed 
out, we are not proceeding in equity on the grounds that the 
rates charged were higher than were necessary to yield a fair 
return to the railroads. This is an extraneous matter. We are 
proceeding on the grounds that the rates were Hillegal" because 
they exceeded the only valid and effective tariffs on file. 
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furthermore, in this case the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission in its subsequent report and order does not say any-
thing which would indicate an attempt or desire to make the 
new rates retroactive. The orders of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission dated in December, 1959 and April, 1960 (Ex-
hibits 11 and 12) do not find that during the period in question, 
i.e. June 22, 1956 to August 28, 1958, the railroads needed 
more revenue from intrastate rates. They find that they do 
need more revenue from intrastate rates as of the date of 
December 7, 1959. However, they do not make any attempt 
to make either their order or their findings retroactive. The 
situation resulting from this new Interstate Commerce Com-
mission Order is exactly what the Circuit Court of Appeals 
indicated it might be when on July 8, 1959 they issued their 
opinion in Structural Steel & Forge Co. v. Union Pacific Rail-
road Co., supra. There the court stated: 
((Moreover, any final order establishing prevailing 
rates after further hearing before the Interstate Com-
merce Commission may very well be prospective in 
effect, leaving the subject matter of these actions un-
supported by any valid order." 
We wish to point out that this subsequent order of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission is now under attack in the 
United States Court for the District of Utah, the action chal-
lenging that order having been argued and submitted to that 
court on the 8th day of August, 1960. 
The Interstate Commerce Commission having been with-
out jurisdiction to issue the order raising Utah intrastate rates, 
the order \vas void from the beginning. The situation is en-
tirely different from the Atlantic Coast Line case where the 
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defect was not in the evidence and only in the findings and 
the order therefore only voidable. The order having been void 
the Interstate Commerce Commission could not make any 
subsequent order retroactive even if it had tried to do so, as 
can be seen by an examination of the subsequent order, it 
did not attempt to do. The lower court therefore erred 
in holding that the Interstate Commerce Commission had 
jurisdiction to issue the increased rates. It had the power to 
enter upon the hearing for the purpose of determining the 
matter of jurisdiction, but when the evidence establishing 
jurisdiction failed, it had no further power and the order 
which it issued was void. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFFS MUST SHOW A BASIS FOR RECOVERY 
UPON EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES BEFORE JUDGMENT 
COULD BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS. 
The trial court in its conclusions of law appears to imply 
that the plaintiffs could recover if, but only if, they proved 
that the rates actually charged were unreasonably high. This 
is not the theory upon which this case is brought at all. 
In the field of transportation law, there are two terms 
which have come to have definite meaning in regard to excessive 
rates. These terms are nillegal rates" and («unlawful rates." 
An illegal rate is one in excess of the tariffs of the carrier on 
file and in effect. Generally the filing of tariffs is done pursuant 
to statutory requirement and as a usual thing the governmental 
unit requiring the filing of the tariffs will also have a statute 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
prohibiting the charging of more than the amounts established 
by the tariff. Such a statute is Sec. 54-3-7, U.C.A., 1953. 
An "unlawful" rate is one which, while in accordance 
·with the tariff on file and in effect, is unreasonably high. In 
other words, it much more than compensates the carrier for 
the cost of hauling plus a reasonable return on its investment. 
Rates which are "legal" may be ((unlawful" as a result of 
a number of situations. First, the tariff may have been filed 
without hearing, which may be done under certain circum-
stances, or second, conditions may have changed with the 
passage of time so that a rate which was, when filed, both 
legal and lawful has become unlawful even though it is still 
legal. A good discussion of the distinction between legal and 
lawful rates is found in the case of Arizona Grocery Co. v. 
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 284 U. S. 370; 76 L.ed 349. 
It is not necessary that a rate be both unlawful and illegal 
in order to enable the shipper to recover the excess. He may 
recover if it is either unlawful or illegal. In this regard the 
following language is found in 13 C.J.S. at pages 770 and 771: 
"Practically any charge in excess of the amount 
\vhich the carrier is entitled to collect, under the rules 
stated in §§ 312-314 supra, constitutes an overcharge 
to the extent of the excess, ~rhile sums which the 
carrier \vas lawfully entitled to collect cannot ordi-
narily be recovered as an overcharge, although they 
were in excess of the rate charged a favored shipper. 
Thus, there may be an overcharge because the rate 
or charge applied violates a contract between the 
parties, is unreasonable, is above the lawful tariff rate 
or in excess of the rate fixed by law, because an error 
was made by the carrier in the figuring of the mileage 
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covered by the carriage, more goods were charged for 
than were actually carried, the charges were computed 
on the basis of a weight which was inaccurate and 
improper, the charges included an additional charge 
for an item or service for which the carrier is not 
entitled to be compensated, or because the carrier has 
shipped the goods over a longer route and charged 
the tariff rate therefor when a shorter and cheaper 
route was available." 
The Arizona Grocery Company case supra in holding that 
there was a right to recover in the event of the charging of 
either an illegal or unlawful rate holds at 284 U.S. 384: 
(Cin order to render rates definite and certain, and 
to prevent discrimination and other abuses, the statute 
required the filing and publishing of tariffs specifying 
the rates adopted by the carrier, and made these the 
legal rates, that is, those which must be charged to 
all shippers alike. Any deviation from the published 
rate was declared a criminal offense, and also a civil 
wrong giving rise to an action for damages by the 
injured shipper. Although the Act thus created a legal 
rate it did not abrogate, but expressly affirmed, the 
common-law duty to charge no more than a reasonable 
rate, and left upon the carrier the burden of conform-
ing its charges to that standard. In other words, the 
legal rate was not made by the statute a lawful rate,-
it was lawful only if it was reasonable. Under § 6 the 
shipper was bound to pay the legal rate; but if he 
could show that it was unreasonable he might recover 
reparation.'' 
It is obvious that an action to recover reparations on the 
basis that the rate charged was unlawful places a much greater 
burden of proof on the shipper than does an action for an 
overcharge on an illegal rate. An action to recover under an 
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unla\\·ful rate is purely an equitable action; almost in the 
nature of an unjust enrichment action. The shipper must show 
that the rate charged gave excessive returns to the carrier. In 
such a proceeding, of course, carrier earnings and carrier costs 
must be gone into, a things which is very difficult for a shipper 
to do. The Atlantic Coast Line case which we discussed in the 
next preceding section was such an action. The shippers were 
attempting to recover on an equitable basis and not on a legal 
basis, and the court held that the shippers had not shown 
that the rates charged ((offend against equity or conscience." 
An action to recover an excess under an illegal rate is 
purely a legal action, generally based upon statute. The carrier 
does not have to show the shipper's earnings, nor the cost 
of rendering the service of hauling the shipper's merchandise. 
The shipper need only show that the amount charged by the 
carrier was in excess of the legal tariffs on file and in effect. 
As is stated in the Arizona Grocery Case supra, nAny devia-
tion from the published rate was declared a criminal offense, 
and also a civil wrong giving rise to an action for damages 
by the injured shipper." 
The trial court erred therefore in holding that there was 
any obligation on the plaintiffs in this case to show that the 
rates charged were ((unlawful" or ((unreasonable." 
POIN'T FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE ACT OF THE RAILROADS IN MAILING THE 
TARIFFS EFFECTUATING THE INCREASE TO THE' 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AS AUTHORIZED BY 
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THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, BUT AS 
DENIED BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH WAS AN EFFECTIVE FILING UNDER THE LAWS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The holding of the court to the effect that the higher tariffs 
were legally filed and in effect depends upon the most tenuous 
reasoning. Let us review the facts regarding the filing as 
established by the evidence in this case. Sec. 54-3-6, U.C.A. 
1953, requires common carriers to file their schedules of rates 
and charges with the Public Service Commission of Utah. Sec. 
54-3-7 prohibits a carrier from charging more or less than the 
schedules uon file and in effect." Sec. 54-7-12 U.C.A. 1953 
provides that no public utility shall raise any fare "except 
upon a showing before the Commission and a finding by the 
Commission that such increase is justified." Certainly the term 
((commission" as set forth refers to no other commission than 
the Public Service Commission of Utah. 
The railroads did make application to the Public Service 
Commission of Utah for permission to increase their rates. 
The Commission, however, did not make a finding that the 
increases were justified, but expressly held that the evidence 
presented did not warrant an increase (Ex. 2c, Page 43). 
The railroads thereupon went to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission which issued the void order. Once again the Public 
Service Commission, in answer to the ultimatum of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, refused to find that the rates 
were justified and could go into effect (Ex. 10). The Inter-
state Commerce Commission then issued its order declaring 
the rates were in effect. The railroads, in addition to filing 
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the new and higher tariffs on Utah intrastate rates with the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, also mailed copies of the 
new and higher schedules to the Public Service Commission. 
Rather than dropping these schedules in the waste basket, as 
they no doubt could have done, the Public Service Commission 
placed them in a file. It was the position of the railroads in 
the court below, and the holding of the court in its conclusions 
of law that such placing of these schedules in the file con-
stituted them as legal and valid rates. This was held despite 
the fact that they were filed in direct contravention of the 
laws of the State of Utah above quoted and in violation of 
the orders of the Public Service Commission of Utah. So novel 
is this contention that as might be expected, there are no cases 
on the point. However, no cases are necessary. As the in-
creased rates as filed were in direct contravention of the 
statutes of the state of Utah and of the order of the Public 
Service Commission of Utah, they certainly had no force and 
effect under the laws of the state of Utah. 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE SUBSEQUENT ORDER OF THE INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE COMMISSION ISSUED IN DECEMBER, 1959, 
REP AIRED THE DEFECTS FOUND BY THE SUPREME 
COURT IN THE EARLIER ORDER. 
Following the entry of the mandate of the Supreme Court, 
under the direction of which the district court set aside the 
Interstate Commerce Commission order raising the Utah intra-
state rates, the Interstate Commerce Commission entered on 
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further hearings involving Utah intrastate rates. They held 
hearings in October of 1958 and January of 1959. On De-
cember 7, 1959, they issued an order which became effective 
in March of 1960, once again raising Utah intrastate rates. 
As has been previously stated, that order is now being attacked 
in the federal courts. The case has been argued but as of this 
writing no decision has been rendered. However, whether the 
subsequent order is set aside or not can have no bearing on this 
case. The complete order of the Commission is in this record 
as Exhibit No. 11, and it does not purport to have any retro-
active effect. All of the findings as appear in the report on 
pages 2 5 to 29 of that exhibit are couched in the present tense. 
They make no reference to conditions existing prior to De-
cember 7, 1959. These findings are just as the Circuit Court, 
in Structural Steel & Forge Co. et al v. Union Pacific RR et al, 
said they might be ((prospective in effect leaving the subject 
matter of these actions unsupported by any valid order." 
We do not have a case here such as we had in the Atlantic 
Coast Line case where the subsequent order of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission merely corrected the defective findings 
in the original order and made the finding that the higher 
rates should have been in effect during the crucial period. In 
our case the Interstate Commerce Commission could not have 
made any retroactive finding and did no try to make any retro-
active finding. Therefore, the order of December 7, 1959, 
whether valid or invalid as will be determined in the federal 
court action, is prospective in effect only. 
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POINT SIX 
Tl--IE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
AN APPLICATION TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH FOR REPARATIONS IS A PREREQUI-
SITE TO THE BRINGING OF AN ACTION IN THE 
COURTS 1~0 RECOVER AN OVERCHARGE. 
Section 54-7-20 U.C.A. 1953 makes administrative pro-
vision for applying to the Public Service Commission of Utah 
for reparations in the case of the charging-by the carrier to the 
shipper of either an unlawful or illegal rate. The court below 
held that this remedy was exclusive and abrogated any right 
which a shipper might have to direct recourse to the courts. 
In the first place it should be pointed out that the language of 
54-7-20 is inconsistent with any theory that it is the exclusive 
remedy. The statute says that when an excessive rate has been 
charged, nthe Commission may order that the public utility 
make due reparation.'' An election is therefore left to the Public 
Service Commission as to whether it will or will not issue a 
reparations order even when the circumstances justify it. The 
statute is silent on the question of whether or not the statutory 
remedy is exclusive. If it is held to be exclusive it must be on 
the basis of implication. Certainly it would not be consistent 
to say that the statute by implication takes away a right which 
the shipper had at common law merely because the Public 
Service Commission may in its discretion take jurisdiction of 
a reparations case. Suppose the Commission does not want to 
take jurisdiction, and it appears it does not have to under the 
law, then the shipper has been deprived of a right in the courts 
and has not been given an equal administrative right. 
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It is the position of the appellants that the Utah case of 
Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v. Denver & R.G. RR. Co., 60 Utah 
153, 207 P. 155, is determinative in this matter. In the Jeremy 
case the statute involved is a different statute from 54-7-20. 
However, the principles are the same. In that case the shipper 
brought action for an overcharge. The defendant railroads 
alleged that as Section 454, Compiled Laws of Utah 1907, 
provided a statutory remedy for shippers who were over-
charged, the common law right of action was abrogated. The 
court discussed this matter at some length as follows: 
nit is contended that this statute gives a complete 
remedy to a shipper who has been overcharged, and, 
being in force when plaintiff's cause of action accrued, 
the shipper has no remedy at common law. Winsor 
v. C. & A. R.R. (C.C.) 52 Fed. 716, and Beadle v. 
Railroad, 51 Kan. 248, 32 Pac. 910, squarely support 
the proposition advanced by appellant. The same rule 
is laid down in I Rorer on Railroads, p. 570. There is, 
however, a contrariety of opinion upon this subject. 
In 2 Elliott on Railroads, § 711, the rule is asserted 
to be that-
«Unless the common-law right of action is thereby 
taken away in express terms or by necessary implication, 
the penalty imposed by a penal statute is cumulative 
only, and the common-law right of action continues to 
exist unimpaired.' 
nin 10 C.J. p. 451, § 709, it is said: 
«The common-law remedy for excessive freight 
charges is not abrogated by a statute authorizing re-
covery of the charges collected in excess of the rates 
properly chargeable under a railroad commission law.' 
USe also, 4 R.C.L. 654 § 131. 
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" In I-Ieiserman v. B., C.R. & N.R.R., 63 Iowa, 732, 
18 N.W. 903, it is held that: 
(The liability of defendant for money collected for 
the transportation of property, in excess of reasonable 
charges, existed at common law. The enactment of a 
statute imposing penalties for excessive charges, re-
coverable by the party in jured, or providing that for 
exacting and collecting them the agent of the railroad 
company shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, does not 
take away the right existipg at common law to recover 
money paid in excess of reasonable charges. * * * The 
injured party may waive the tort created by statute, 
and sue upon the implied contract raised by the law, 
whereby the carrier is obliged to repay the consignee 
or consignor of the property all sums exacted in excess 
of reasonable compensation.' 
'(See, also, Fletcher Paper Co. v. D. & M.R.R., 198 
Mich. 469, 164 N.W. 528; Smith v. C. & N.W. Co., 
49 Wis. 443, 5 N.W. 240; Goodridge v. U.P.R.R. Co. 
( C.C.) 3 5 Fed. 3 5; La Floridienne v. A.C.L.R.R., 63 
Fla. 208, 212, 58 South 182; Sullivan v. Railroad, 121 
Minn 488, 142 N.W. 3, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 612. 
"The statute of this state which was in force when 
plaintiffs cause of action accrued did not suspend 
other remedies and did not abrogate the common-law 
remedy. As plaintiffs cause of action was not based 
upon the statute, the court committed no error in over-
ruling appellant's demurrer which raised the question 
of the statute of limitations.'' 
The existence of Section 54-7-20 was not raised as a 
defense by the railroads in the Jeremy case, even though that 
section was in force and effect in 1919 when the Jeremy case 
was tried and decided. It was not in effect between November 
of 1914 and November of 1917 when the excessive rates were 
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charged. However, if it was a good defense it could have 
been raised because it is a too well established point of law 
to require comment that while substantive rights are deter-
mined by the laV\t in effect at the time the cause of action arises, 
procedural remedies are governed by the law in effect when 
the action is commenced. Therefore, the Jeremy case was tried 
with the exact provisions in effect that are relied upon here. 
In the Annotations to Sec. 54-7-20 under the heading 
Remedies is found the following footnote: 
((Under subd. (2) of this section the shipper may 
invoke any common-law remedies he may have to 
recover excessive and discriminatory freight charges. 
In other words, the statutory remedies are cumulative. 
Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 60 
U. 153, 207 P. 155." 
Clearly, therefore, the compilers of the code regarded 
the Jeremy case as controlling in regard to Sec. 54-7-20. 
There are a number of cases from other jurisdictions 
which hold that where reparation is sought on the ground that 
the rate charges is an ((unlawful rate/' as we have above de-
scribed that term, application should first be made to the 
administrative body. The basis of the holding in these cases 
is to the effect that recourse should first be had to the com-
mission because the determination of what was fair and just 
rates is a complicated matter which requires a certain amount 
of expertness. Therefore when reparations are sought on the 
basis that public tariffs are too high, recourse should first be 
had to the commission which has the jurisdiction to approve 
the tariffs to determine whether in fact the tariffs are too high. 
ln this case the question of whether or not the tariffs are too 
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high or too low is beside the point. We are seeking reparations 
on the ground that the rates charged are in excess of the legally 
published rates. A court is as well equipped as a commission 
to determine that question. Furthermore the commission has 
already determined by approving the filings that are in effect, 
that the filed rates are just and reasonable. We have a statute 
requiring that no charges shall be made in excess of these 
established rates. There appears to be nothing, therefore, 
which the court cannot do in a common law action as expe-
ditious! y as the commission could do in an application made 
to the commission for reparations. 
The Interstate Commerce Act has a provision conferring 
jurisdiction on the Interstate Commerce Commission to hear 
applications for reparation in the case of interstate rates. This 
provision of the Interstate Commerce Act, however, expressly 
reserves to shippers their common law rights and therefore is 
not directly in point here. However, a California case inter-
preting the California statute in light of the Interstate Com-
merce Act is in point. Sec. 71 of the Public Utilities Act of 
California confers jurisdiction on the Public Utilities Com-
mission to hear reparations claims. That statute, like ours, 
is silent on the question of whether the statutory remedy is 
exclusive or cumulative. In holding that it is cumulative, the 
Supreme Court of California in the case of Southern Pacific 
v. Superior Court, 150 Pac. 397, reasoned as follows, from 
the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act: 
((That the interpretation which has been placed upon 
the Interstate Commerce Act by the highest court of 
the land should be followed by this court ,when like 
questions arise out of state laws, results not because 
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of any compelling authority, since for the most part 
these are questions for local determination. But it is 
evident that the system of regulation of rates and 
fares provided in the Constitution and statutes of 
California, to which we have referred, has been 
modeled upon the federal act for the regulation of 
commerce between the states. This being so, it will be 
assumed that the people of California, in enacting the 
same or similar terms of their written law, intended 
to express the same meaning as that established as 
the true meaning of the law from which these laws of 
the state have been derived." 
In the above case an action for reparations was sought on 
the grounds that the railroad had charged the shipper $28.97 
for a certain shipment, whereas in fact the tariffs on file and 
in effect provided for a charge of $15.98. The action was for 
the difference of $12.99. The railroad in that case, as have 
the railroads here, maintained that the common law action 
was abrogated by the statutes providing the statutory remedy. 
The court concluded as follows: 
((Our sole concern is to ascertain and to determine 
\\'hether the subject-matter of the case was within the 
jurisdiction of the court which rendered the judgment. 
In view of the several provisions of the written law 
to which we have referred and some of which are fully 
set forth herein, and in the light of the decisions to 
which reference has been made, we are of the opinion 
that the superior court had jurisdiction to hear and 
determine the case presented to it and to render the 
judgment." 
The basis of all the cases holding that recourse may be 
had either to the courts or to the commission, where a statutory 
method of gaining reparation is provided, is that the statute 
32 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
creates a tort action and, to use the language quoted \Vith 
approval in the Jeremy case, nthe injured party may waiye 
the tort created by statute, and sue upon the implied contract 
raised by the law, whereby the carrier is obliged to repay the 
consignee or consignor of the property all sums exacted in 
excess of reasonable compensation." 
Furthermore, we \vould like to point out here that if 
the statutory remedy with its short statute of limitations was 
exclusive, the statute of limitations would have run on a 
substantial portion of the plaintiff's claims in this case prior 
to the time that they were able to get the Supreme Court of 
the United States to act and declare void the invalid order of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission under which the railroads 
purported to be collecting the illegal rates. 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel submits that the lower court interpreted the law 
erroneously in this case. The order of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission relied upon by the defendants was issued without 
jurisdiction and was void from its inception. The rates charged 
were clearly illegal under the laws of the State of Utah. The 
plaintiffs had the right to proceed in this court to recover the 
amount over and above the legal rates. This matter, therefore, 
should be returned to the District Court with orders to enter 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and to proceed to determine 
the amount of the overcharges. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
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